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Murat Akpinar
Market entry strategies in the Turkish 
automotive industry
Abstract
Initial and subsequent market entry mode choices of multinational  enterprises 
(MNEs) depend on MNE managers’ perceptions of the potential to capture 
­additional­competitiveness­by­internalizing­their­unique­firm-specific­advantages­
(FSAs),­also­called­ownership­ (O)-specific­advantages,­ together­with­ the­host­
countries’­country-specific­advantages­ (CSAs)­also­called­ location­ (L)-specific­
advantages (Dunning 1988; Hennart 2009; Rugman et al. 2012). During the last decade we 
observe­a­significant­shift­of­automotive­production­ in­Europe­from­the­West­ to­ the­East,­and­
Turkey­has­been­one­of­ the­major­beneficiaries­of­ this­ change.­ In­ this­paper­we­analyze­ the­
roots­of­Turkey’s­evolving­CSAs­and­ try­ to­understand­ their­differing­ impacts­on­market­entry­
 strategies of MNEs in the automotive industry with the help of the diamond model (Porter 1990). 
We apply a longitudinal approach in our empirical study and focus on developments in the period 
between­ the­years­2000­and­2010.­We­find­out­ that­Turkey’s­national­diamond­has­ improved­
over the decade led by improving political leadership and stability, as well as institutional reforms 
and­consequent­economic­stability­following­the­banking­crisis­in­2001.­We­also­find­out­that­the­
country’s diamond has strengthened by the implementation of the customs union in 1996 and the 
beginning of membership negotiations with the European Union (EU) in 2005. Despite the fact 
that these developments have led to a fast growth of the automotive industry in Turkey, we notice 
that MNEs have responded differently in their market entry strategies, and these differences 
rely­on­the­match­of­their­strategic­positions­and­market­entry­motives­with­CSAs.­Based­on­our­
observations we make clear propositions that link market entry choices to generic strategies and 
market entry motives. We recommend further similar longitudinal research in different countries 
and­industries­to­test­our­findings.
1. Introduction
International business literature has investigated deeply MNE’s choices of foreign market  entry 
modes­ through­ the­ lenses­ of­ transaction­ cost­ theory,­ internalization­ theory,­ resource-based­
view­ (RBV),­and­ institutional­ theory­ (Meyer/Peng­2005).­These­modes­are­classified­as­non-
equity­(or­contractual)­modes­and­equity­modes.­In­non-equity­modes­the­MNE­does­not­invest­
 equity in the foreign market but serves or supplies from the foreign market through contractual 
agreements. These modes include exporting, licensing, franchising, and outsourcing. In equity 
modes,­the­MNE­invests­equity­in­the­foreign­market.­They­are­classified­as­portfolio­investment­
or­­foreign­direct­investment­(FDI)­where­FDI­could­be­in­the­way­of­joint-venture­or­wholly-owned­
 subsidiary based on the level of ownership (Welch et al. 2007). In portfolio investment the MNE 
holds a minority stake in shares of the foreign operation. In this type of investment the MNE 
­neither­intends­to­influence­the­strategy­of­the­foreign­operation­nor­has­any­long-term­commit-
ment­to­it.­A­joint-venture­is­established­with­the­MNE­partners­on­an­equal­basis­with­a­local­firm.­
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This­equal­basis­is­reflected­not­only­in­the­share­distribution­but­also­in­the­assets­contributed­
and­the­level­of­control­exerted­by­the­two­firms.­In­a­wholly-owned­subsidiary­the­MNE­has­full­
control over the operations.  
It­is­the­FDI­mode­which­allows­MNEs­capture­CSAs.­Accelerating­globalization­after­the­1990s­
with­the­establishment­of­regional­unions­with­free­flows­of­goods,­services,­capital­and­labor,­
active involvement of the world trade organization (WTO), and more welcoming attitudes of host 
countries­towards­MNEs­have­contributed­to­increasing­cross-border­trade­and­FDI­activity.­As­
a result, MNEs have been faced with an interesting opportunity to respond to these changes 
by­ adapting­ their­market­ entry­ strategies­ and­ reconfiguring­ their­ value­ chains­ regionally­with­
the­purposes­of­developing­their­competitiveness.­One­source­of­firm-level­competitiveness­can­
be­unique,­ rare,­ valuable,­ hard-to-imitate­ resources­of­ the­ firm,­ i.e.­ sources­of­FSAs,­ and­ its­
corresponding strategic positioning (Barney 1991). A second source could be the diamond in 
the­MNE’s­home-country­including­factor­conditions,­demand­conditions,­related­and­­supporting­
industries,­ and­ firm­ strategy,­ structure­ and­ rivalry­ (Porter­ 1990).­ A­ third­ source­ could­ be­ the­
­diamond­of­ the­MNE’s­home­region,­ i.e.­ the­double­diamond­(Rugman/D’Cruz­1993).­A­fourth­
source­could­be­the­host­countries’­diamonds,­i.e.­their­CSAs­(Dunning­1988).­Or,­perhaps­it­is­
in­the­appropriate­combination­or­internalization­of­CSAs­and­FSAs­that­MNE­competitiveness­
occurs (Dunning 1988; Rugman et al. 2012). 
Given­evolving­CSAs­of­a­host­country,­ it­ is­ interesting­ to­see­whether­all­MNEs­would­adapt­
their market entry strategies similarly to take advantage of them given their differing FSAs and 
 corresponding strategic positions and motives. In case we observe different behaviors, we would 
be­further­interested­to­understand­what­influences­their­differing­decisions­most­and­which­types­
of­FSAs­match­best­which­types­of­the­host-country’s­CSAs.
To achieve our aim we focus on the European automotive industry and MNEs’ changes in  market 
entry strategies to Turkey during the period between 2000 and 2010. The European  automotive 
industry is highly competitive bearing some of the world’s largest MNEs such as the Volkswagen 
Group,­Toyota,­PSA­Peugeot-Citroën,­Ford,­General­Motors,­Renault­and­Fiat.­The­­establishment­
of the Single Market in the EU in 1992 has created the world’s largest  automotive market and 
­intensified­ competition­ leading­ to­ further­ consolidation­ in­ the­ industry­ through­ ­mergers­ and­
­acquisitions­decreasing­from­31­MNEs­in­1990­to­21­MNEs­in­2005­(Akpinar­2009).­­Competitive­
Japanese and Korean manufacturers have increased their commitment and  presence in this 
 attractive market by shifting their market entry modes from exporting to FDI. Alliances among 
MNEs as well as international sourcing and manufacturing have increased. The eastern  expansion 
of the EU in 2004, the establishment of a customs union between the EU and Turkey in 1996, and 
the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 have been major developments in Europe 
to offer opportunities for MNEs to reconsider their market entry strategies in the EU. Focus on a 
specific­region­such­as­the­EU­is­based­on­the­fact­that­MNEs­in­the­automotive­industry­pursue­
regional­strategies­rather­than­global­ones­(Rugman/Collinson­2004).
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The establishment of Turkey’s automotive industry dates back to the 1950s. The1980s saw 
changes­in­government­policy­which­shifted­the­nature­of­the­industry­from­import-substitution­
to­export-orientation­(Wasti/Wasti­2008).­Following­the­customs­union­with­the­EU­in­year­1996,­
Turkey has increasingly become a production base for the automotive industry, building on 
­advantages­such­as­highly-skilled­labor­at­comparatively­low­cost,­access­to­cheap­raw­­materials,­
and­the­geographic­proximity­to­European­markets­(McKinsey­Global­Institute­2003).­Reflecting­
our research questions in view of this context we want to understand how differently MNEs in the 
automotive­industry­adopt­their­market­entry­strategies­in­response­to­the­evolving­CSAs­offered­
by Turkey, and what the underlying reasons behind these differences may be. Among possible 
reasons­we­investigate­FSAs­as­reflected­in­corresponding­generic­strategies,­and­market­entry­
motives to Turkey.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, a theoretical framework 
is developed from earlier literature, and the methodology of the empirical study is described in 
section three. The results are shared in section four, and the paper ends with a discussion of the 
findings­in­section­five.
2. Literature Review
In this section we aim to develop an appropriate theoretical framework to study the impacts of 
evolving­host-country­CSAs­on­changes­in­market­entry­strategies­of­MNEs­in­the­light­of­their­
FSAs and corresponding generic strategies, and market entry motives towards the host country.
2.1 Market Entry Strategy and Motives towards Host Country
The international business literature differentiates between equity modes (e.g., FDI through 
joint­ venture­ or­ wholly-owned­ subsidiary)­ and­ contractual­ modes­ (e.g.,­ exporting,­ licensing,­
­franchising)­ of­ foreign­ market­ entry­ (see­ Buckley/Casson­ 1998).­ There­ is­ also­ a­ distinction­
­between­organic­modes­of­entry­(i.e.­greenfield­investments)­and­external­modes­of­entry­(i.­e.­
mergers &  acquisitions) (see Hennart and Park 1993). In this research we adopt a limited but 
dynamic­definition­of­market­entry­strategy.­Our­focus­is­on­the­distinction­between­non-equity­
mode of entry and equity mode of entry, and due to their suitability for the automotive industry, 
we­focus­specifically­on­the­modes­of­exporting and production FDI. The dynamic nature of our 
definition­arises­in­that­we­analyze­changes­in­the­choices­of­market­entry­strategy­from­2000­to­
2010. Possible changes in strategy could imply establishment of a production subsidiary in the 
foreign­market,­versus­closure­of­a­production­subsidiary,­or­significant­changes­in­production­
volumes in the host country.
MNEs will prefer equity modes when there is need to have control over foreign operations which 
may­ arise­ when­ MNEs­ have­ knowledge­ assets­ which­ are­ difficult­ to­ transfer­ in­ ­contractual­
agreements (Kogut/Zander 1993), when the institutional environment is not developed to allow 
Murat Akpinar
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for  protection of knowledge assets over contractual agreements (Meyer/Peng 2005), or when 
­total­ costs­ of­ non-equity­ modes,­ including­ transportation­ costs,­ customs­ duties­ and­ tariffs,­
and­ ­contractual­costs,­are­higher­ (Buckley/Casson­1976).­On­establishing­ the­FDI,­MNEs­will­
choose­to­establish­a­joint-venture­when­resource­contributions­from­a­local­partner­are­needed­
(Brouthers/Hennart­ 2007).­ Local­market­ knowledge,­ ease­ of­ access­ to­ distribution­ channels,­
 excellent  relations to local governments are some of the key resources to be provided by local 
partners. These contributions by local partners will aid to overcome the liabilities of foreignness or 
outsidership in international markets (Zaheer 1995; Johanson/Vahlne 2009). Such  dependence 
on resources explains why this hybrid mode of market entry is indeed the most commonly ob-
served mode (Hennart 1988). 
The shift from contractual modes to equity modes will occur in time as MNEs increase their  foreign 
market knowledge and commitment to the foreign market gradually (Johanson/Vahlne 1977). 
Based on observations from the automotive industry where economies of scale are  important, we 
realize that exporting and FDI are not necessarily substitution strategies but  complementary ones 
when we consider transaction costs and scale economies simultaneously (Pyo 2010).  According 
to this, even though transaction costs of exporting may be high, MNEs which lack minimum 
­efficient­scale­in­the­foreign­market­will­still­prefer­to­export­rather­than­make­FDI.­
In­making­FDI­MNEs­will­ target­ to­ internalize­ location-specific­advantages­of­ the­host­country­
(i.­e.­CSAs)­ together­with­ their­ownership-specific­advantages­(i.e.­FSAs)­ (Dunning­1988).­We­
adapt the typology of motives for FDI by Dunning (1988) as market entry motives towards host 
country. The motives are market-seeking, resource- or strategic asset-seeking, and efficiency-
seeking. In­market-seeking­FDI,­objectives­are­ to­be­close­ to­an­attractive­market­ in­order­ to­
understand market behavior and respond quickly to changing demand conditions, secure access 
to distribution channels, and avoid high transportation costs to that market. The attractiveness of 
the­market­is­determined­mostly­by­its­size­as­well­as­its­growth­potential.­In­resource-­or­strategic­
asset-seeking­FDI,­the­objective­is­to­have­access­to­valuable­resources­(e.g.,­natural­resources,­
skilled workforce) or created assets (e.g., strategic brand name, patented innovation). Finally, 
in­ efficiency-seeking­ FDI,­ the­main­ objective­ is­ to­minimize­ costs­ of­ production­ and­ improve­
­profitability.­Locations­that­suit­this­type­of­FDI­best­may­offer­low-cost­labor,­low-cost­materials­
or tax advantages.
2.2 Host country CSAs
In­order­to­understand­the­roots­of­CSAs,­we­will­focus­on­the­Diamond­Model­by­Porter­(1990)­
and­ the­ Double-Diamond­Model­ by­ Rugman­ and­ D’Cruz­ (1993).­ In­ the­ diamond­model,­ the­
roots of competitive advantage are factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting 
 industries, and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry.
Factor conditions are the country’s resources for enabling the means of production such as 
 human resources, physical resources, knowledge resources, capital resources and  infrastructure 
­(Porter­1990:­74-75).­Human­resources­ include­the­quantity,­skills­and­cost­of­employees­and­
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 management. Physical resources could be abundance, quality, accessibility and cost of the 
 country’s natural resources, as well as the country’s location, geographic size and climate 
­conditions.­ Knowledge­ resources­ are­ the­ country’s­ stock­ of­ scientific,­ technical­ and­ ­market­
­know­ledge­ on­ goods­ and­ services­ residing­ in­ universities­ and­ research­ institutes.­ Capital­
­resources­mean­the­amount­and­cost­of­capital­available­to­finance­businesses.­Finally,­ infra-
structure  covers the quality and cost of the transportation system, the communication system, 
the­postal­system,­the­payment­system,­and­the­health­care­system­in­the­country.­­Competitive­
­advantage­ from­ ­factors­ depends­ on­ how­efficiently­ and­ effectively­ they­ are­ deployed­ (Porter­
1990: 76).  Porter also categorizes the factors as basic factors and advanced factors. Basic factors 
are  natural  resources, climate, location, unskilled and semiskilled labor, and capital. Advanced 
 factors  include modern communications infrastructure, highly educated human  resources, and 
innovation-driving­ research­ institutes.­ Whereas­ basic­ factors­ are­ mostly­ inherited,­ advanced­
 factors are usually created. While basic factors are needed for competitive advantage, it is usually 
through the creation of advanced factors that sustained competitive advantage can be achieved 
(Porter 1990: 77).
Demand­conditions­reflect­the­nature­of­the­mix­and­character­of­the­country’s­buyers­and­their­
needs. Elements of demand conditions include segment structure of demand, sophisticated and 
demanding buyers, anticipatory buyer needs, size of demand, number of independent buyers, 
growth rate of home demand, early home demand, early saturation, mobile or multinational  local 
buyers, and influences on foreign needs­ (Porter­ 1990:­ 86-99).­Demand­ conditions­will­ affect­
 positively on competitiveness of an industry when there are large global segments in demand 
composition (especially in industries where economies of scale is important), when the  buyers 
 (including distribution channels) are among the world’s most sophisticated and demanding 
 buyers, when the needs of buyers in the country anticipate those in other countries, when there 
a large number of independent buyers, when the growth rate of home demand is high, when 
buyers have demand for new products at early stages, when early demand moves fast to early 
 saturation, and when local demand is transferred abroad through mobile or multinational local 
buyers­or­other­influences.­The­existence­of­these­conditions­will­pressure­local­firms­to­move­
ahead of their rivals in their innovation and upgrading processes.
The third determinant of national competitive advantage in the diamond model is related to 
 supporting industries. Supporting industries are supplier industries. Existence of  internationally 
competitive­supplier­ industries­will­not­only­provide­early­access­to­cost-effective,­high­­quality­
 inputs but also foster high level R&D cooperation that will result in joint innovation solutions  (Porter 
1990:­101-104).­Related­ industries­are­ those­ in­which­firms­can­coordinate­or­share­ ­activities­
in the value chain when competing, or those which involve products that are  complementary 
­(Porter­ 1990:­ 105).­ Location-based­ close­ cooperation­ with­ supplier­ industries­ and­ related­
 industries through information exchange and joint projects forms the fundamental idea behind 
the­­emergence­of­the­cluster­concept.­Clusters­are­geographic­concentrations­of­interconnected­
companies­and­institutions­in­a­particular­field­(Porter­1998:­78).­Clusters­play­a­positive­role­in­
competitiveness­in­three­ways.­First­of­all,­the­productivity­levels­of­firms­in­the­cluster­improve.­
This­is­because­firms­gain­scale­advantages­without­giving­up­their­flexibilities,­and­they­also­have­
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easier access to specialized information, suppliers, related industries, and institutions  (Porter 
1998: 81). Secondly, the pace of innovations accelerates through exchange of tacit know ledge 
and­creation­of­ideas­in­informal­face-to-face­meetings,­through­sharing­of­risks­and­­minimizing­
of cost burdens in experimenting new ideas, and through peer and competitive pressure (Porter 
1998: 83). Thirdly, clusters also enable formation of new businesses when  insights and skills from 
different­fields­merge­(Porter­1998:­84).
The­fourth­determinant­of­national­competitive­advantage­in­the­diamond­model­is­firm­strategy,­
structure, and rivalry. There are national differences in management practices and approaches, 
in­the­orientations­of­firms­toward­competing­globally,­in­the­motivations­of­individuals­­(owners,­
managers, and employees), and in the commitments of capital and human resources to an 
­industry­which­affect­the­ways­that­firms­choose­to­compete­and­organize­(Porter­1990:­108-116). 
The degree of domestic rivalry has a positive effect on competitiveness through creating pres-
sures to innovate and outpace rivalry. 
In addition to these four determinants, Porter (1990) also names two variables which may impact 
on competitive advantage through shaping of the determinants. These factors are government 
and chance. The government has legitimate power to exercise authority over other  organizations 
in­a­country.­As­such,­it­has­been­suggested­that­it­should­be­treated­as­a­fifth­determinant­since­
government­regulations­have­direct­influence­on­firms­(see­Rugman/Verbeke­2000).­In­the­EU­
powers of governments have been diminishing as a result of the empowerment of supranational 
institutions­such­as­the­European­Commission­which­sees­to­it­that­governments­do­not­inter-
fere­in­ways­to­affect­free­competition­(Buckley/Ghauri­2004).­Chance­events­occur­outside­the­
­powers­ of­ firms­ and­ create­ discontinuities­ that­may­ result­ in­ changes­ in­ competitive­ position­
(Porter 1990). Wars, natural disasters, acts of pure invention or technological discontinuities, 
political decisions by foreign governments are examples of chance events. The determinants and 
the variables create an interactive dynamic system, i.e. the determinants are subject to change 
in time, and changes in one determinant or variable will trigger changes in other determinants 
(ibid.).
Rugman­and­D’Cruz­(1993)­criticize­the­diamond­model­in­that­it­fails­to­explain­national­­competitive­
advantage­of­small,­open,­trading­economies­like­Canada.­In­return,­they­extend­it­and­offer­the­
double diamond model which looks at not only the home country diamond but also the diamond 
of the home country’s major trading partner. For example, in analyzing the  competitive  advantage 
of­Canadian­ industries,­ they­ take­ into­account­ the­diamonds­of­Canada­and­ the­USA­ (called­
 together the ‘North American diamond’) since these countries have a free trade agreement. 
Such extension of the diamond was also followed by the extension of the concept of national 
competitiveness to the concept of home region competitiveness for a country (see Rugman et al. 
2012). As Turkey has a customs union agreement with the EU, we will take this view into account 
in­analyzing­CSAs­of­Turkey.­
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2.3 FSAs and Generic Strategies
FSAs­ have­ their­ root­ in­ the­RBV­of­ the­ firm­which­ aims­ to­ understand­ sources­ of­ sustained­
­competitive­advantage­by­studying­ the­firm’s­ resources.­Resources­are­defined­as­all­assets,­
capabilities, organizational processes, information, and knowledge that are controlled by a 
firm­(Penrose­1958).­According­ to­Wernerfelt­ (1984)­ resources­and­products­are­ two­sides­of­
the­same­coin.­Barney­(1991)­argues­that­it­is­valuable,­rare,­imperfectly­imitable,­and­hard-to-
substitute  resources (i.e. strategic resources) that drive sustained competitive advantage and 
­deliver­­superior­performance,­so­firms­should­develop­their­value­creating­strategies­based­on­
the analysis of their strategic resources which are their strengths. Resources are valuable when 
they­ ­enable­ the­firm­to­conceive­of­or­ implement­strategies­ that­ improve­ its­efficiency­and­ef-
fectiveness­(Barney­1991:­106).­The­idea­that­rare­resources­possessed­by­the­firm­will­create­
unique­first-mover­advantages­that­can­be­sustained­relies­on­the­assumptions­that­resources­
are­sticky­or­immobile­(i.e.­firm-specific),­and­they­are­difficult­to­create,­imitate,­or­substitute­by­
­competitors­(Barney­1991).­Examples­of­strategic­resources­of­the­firm­could­include­advanced­
technology, advanced machinery and equipment, intellectual property rights, brand names, 
 access to rare raw materials, unique geographic location, advanced human and social capital 
(training,  experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, and insights of individual managers 
and­workers),­and­superior­organizational­planning­and­coordinating­systems­both­inside­the­firm­
and also in the value chain. 
RBV falls short of suggesting a typology of competitive strategies based on exploitation 
of  strategic resources. Therefore, we turn the other side of the coin and look at products for 
 studying  strategic positioning. Strategic positioning means performing different activities from 
 competitors or  performing similar activities in different ways to deliver a unique value  proposition 
to­ ­customers­ (Porter­1996).­ It­ is­about­making­choices­and­ trade-offs,­not­about­ trying­ to­be­
the best  (Magretta 2012). The basis of the positioning can be the choice of product or service 
­varieties­(i.e.­­variety-based­positioning),­the­choice­of­fulfilling­all­needs­of­a­particular­segment­
of­ ­customers­ (i.e.­needs-based­positioning),­or­ the­choice­of­ targeting­all­ customers­who­are­
­accessible­ in­a­ ­particular­way­ (i.e.­access-based­positioning)­ (ibid.).­Porter­ (1990)­provides­a­
typology of three types of generic strategies: cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. In cost 
leadership­strategy,­the­firm­would­choose­and­set­its­activities­in­optimal­ways­to­achieve­lower­
costs­than­its­competitors.­In­differentiation­strategy,­the­choices­of­the­firm­would­be­­targeting­to­
provide unique and superior value to the customers in terms of product quality, special  features, 
or­ superior­ after-sales­ services.­ Finally,­ in­ focus­ strategy,­ the­ firm­ would­ pursue­ either­ cost­
 leadership or differentiation targeting only a certain market segment.
In this research we will utilize cost leadership and differentiation in analyzing generic strategies 
of­automotive­MNEs.­This­is­not­a­bad­choice­given­that­lower­costs­and­differentiation­(reflected­
in­ability­to­earn­higher­revenues)­are­the­true­sources­of­competitive­advantage­and­profitability.­
This is a good choice because development of these strategies also takes indirectly into account 
the­firm’s­strategic­resources­which­lie­on­the­flip­side­of­the­coin.
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2.4 Theoretical Framework
Having­ reviewed­ literature­ on­market­ entry­ strategies­ and­motives,­CSAs,­FSAs­and­generic­
strategies, it is time to present the theoretical framework that we will use in our empirical study. 
Our­goal­is­to­study­changes­in­market­entry­strategies­of­MNEs­in­response­to­evolving­CSAs­
of host countries given that MNEs differ in their market entry motives and generic strategies (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The theoretical framework.
Generic 
strategies
–­Cost­leadership 
– Differentiation
Market entry motives 
– Market seeking 
– Resource seeking 
–­Efficiency­seeking
Changes  
in host-country diamond
– Factor conditions
– Demand conditions
–  Related and supporting 
industries
–  Firm strategy, structure, 
and rivalry
Changes  
in market entry strategy
–  From export to 
 production FDI
–­­Significant­increase­/­ 
 decrease in production
–  From production FDI  
to export
Changes­in­CSAs­of­the­host­country­are­assessed­through­changes­in­the­diamond­of­the­host­
country­ reflected­ by­ factor­ conditions,­ demand­ conditions,­ related­ and­ supporting­ industries,­
and­ firm­strategy,­ structure,­ and­ rivalry.­As­market­ entry­ strategy­we­ focus­on­exporting­ and­
­production­FDI.­Changes­in­this­strategy­could­occur­ in­three­ways.­First­of­all,­ the­firm­could­
change its strategy from exporting to starting production in the host country. Secondly, given 
that­the­firm­already­has­a­production­facility­in­the­host­country,­it­could­decide­to­increase­or­
decrease­production­volume­significantly.­Thirdly,­the­firm­could­decide­to­divest­its­production­
FDI­in­the­host­country­and­change­to­exporting.­Based­on­these­descriptions­our­first­proposition­
is the following:
Proposition 1:  Changes in the diamond of the host country will lead to changes in market entry 
strategies of MNEs.
MNEs will have different generic strategies and different market entry motives. We  differentiate 
here between cost leadership and differentiation generic strategies, and between market  seeking, 
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resource­seeking,­and­efficiency­seeking­market­entry­motives.­The­reasons­for­introducing­these 
variables­are­reflected­in­our­second­and­third­propositions.
Proposition 2:  Changes in market entry strategies of MNEs will differ based on MNEs’ differing 
generic strategies.
Proposition 3:  Changes in market entry strategies of MNEs will differ based on MNEs’ differing 
market entry motives. 
In the empirical study we would like to unveil what kind of change in market entry strategy (if 
any) should be expected in the cases of different generic strategies and different market entry 
 motives. Before getting into that we next describe the methodology applied.
3. Methodology
This research applies longitudinal methodology. This choice is based on two underlying  reasons. 
First, we adopt a dynamic view on strategy by studying changes in strategy in response to 
­changes­in­the­environment­(Porter­1991).­Secondly,­we­assume­strategy-making­to­be­a­­con- 
textual­­process­in­time­whereby­contexts­and­history­are­relevant­(Pettigrew­1990).­­Contexts­are­
 important as they shape actors and also get shaped by actors in a cumulative process over time, 
and understanding the past is crucial since it plays a determining role in shaping the  emerging 
future (Pettigrew 1997). 
In­ studying­ changes­ in­ time­ one­ must­ first­ define­ the­ variables­ to­ be­ studied­ and­ then­ set­
 appropriate measures to detect changes in those variables (Van de Ven 1992). In this study 
we­ first­ assess­ the­ changes­ in­ the­ diamond­ of­ Turkey­ from­2000­ to­ 2010.­ In­ doing­ that,­ the­
 variables used are factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and 
firm­­strategy,­structure,­and­rivalry.­After­this­analysis,­we­look­at­the­responses­of­MNEs­to­these­
changes in the light of their generic strategies and market entry motives. The variables in this 
study and the measures used to detect changes in these variables are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Variables and their measures.
Names of variables Measures Types of measures
Factor conditions Assessment of factor conditions Categorical:­basic,­advanced
Demand conditions Market size Numerical
Related and supporting 
industries
Sizes of related and supporting 
industries
Numerical
Firm strategy, structure, 
and rivalry
Number of competitors and 
 distribution of market shares
Numerical
Market entry strategy Type of market entry strategy Categorical:­export,­production­FDI
Market entry strategy Amount of production units Numerical
Generic strategies Type of generic strategy Categorical:­cost­leadership,­
 differentiation
Market entry motives Type of market entry motive Categorical:­market­seeking,­
­resource­seeking,­efficiency­seeking
Factor conditions, generic strategy, and market entry motives are assessed using categorical 
variables. Factor conditions can be basic or advanced. Types of generic strategies can be cost 
leadership or differentiation. Types of market entry motives can be market seeking, resource 
seeking,­or­efficiency­seeking.­We­use­simultaneously­two­types­of­variables­to­detect­changes­
in market entry strategies. A categorical variable is used for modes of entry. The entry modes can 
be­export­or­production­FDI.­A­numerical­variable­is­also­used­to­detect­significant­changes­in­
the­production­volumes.­Demand­conditions,­related­and­supporting­industries,­and­firm­­strategy,­
structure, and rivalry are assessed using numerical variables. In demand conditions we limit 
our assessment to market size for reasons of simplicity. Related and supporting industries are 
­assessed­by­the­sizes­of­these­industries.­In­assessing­firm­strategy,­structure,­and­rivalry­again­
we limit our assessment to the degree of rivalry expressed by the number of competitors and 
the distribution of their market shares. The higher the number of competitors, and the closer the 
market shares, the higher the degree of rivalry.
Data for this research was collected from trustworthy secondary sources such as websites, 
 reports and other publications of industry associations, MNEs, industry analysts and industry 
media. The use of a variety of trustworthy sources contributed to the objectivity and reliability of 
results. 
The analysis started with the study of changes between 2000 and 2010 in Turkey’s diamond 
and the market entry strategies of all automotive MNEs which entered the Turkish market. Then 
changes in the European location strategies of the MNEs which had production FDI in Turkey 
were­studied.­As­a­result,­changes­in­behavior­patterns­were­identified,­and­they­were­correlated­
against MNEs’ generic strategies and market entry motives.
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4. Results
This section starts with a brief history of developments in the Turkish automotive industry before 
2000 and continues with the assessment of changes in the diamond of Turkey and the accompa-
nying changes in MNE market entry strategies from 2000 to 2010. 
Between­1960­and­1980­Turkey’s­automotive­industry­was­characterized­by­an­import-substitu-
tion strategy with substantially strong import barriers. In this period, Ford, Fiat, and Renault cars 
were domestically assembled by Otosan, Tofas, and Oyak, respectively through license agree-
ments.­Import-substitution­was­replaced­by­export-orientation­following­a­more­liberal­industrial­
policy in the 1980s. In the 1990s the Turkish government offered incentives for FDI that met the 
criteria of having a capacity of more than 100.000 vehicles, sourcing at least 70% locally, and 
of having an export orientation (McKinsey Global Institute 2003). An important development to 
affect the industry was the entry into force of the customs union between Turkey and the EU 
as of January 1, 1996. As a consequence of these developments, Ford acquired 30% equity in 
 Otosan, Fiat purchased 41.5% equity in Tofas, and Renault acquired 51% equity in Oyak which 
was renamed into Oyak Renault. In addition to these FDIs, despite the great macroeconomic 
crisis in the country in 1994, Toyota and Honda also made production investments in Turkey in 
the 1990s. With these investments, the total production capacity reached 700.000 vehicles as 
of 2000, and the exports grew rapidly reaching 96.489 units in 20001. The breakdown of exports 
according to destination markets was as follows: Western Europe (71%), Africa (13%), Eastern 
Europe (6%), Americas (4%), and others (6%)2. Table 2 summarizes key statistics of theTurkish 
automotive industry in 2000.
Table 2: Key statistics of Turkish automotive industry in year 2000.
Domestic 
sales
(units)
Production 
(units)
Exports
(units)
Imports
(units)
Imports/ 
domestic 
sales
(%)
Exports/ 
production 
(%)
Passenger 
cars
466.700 297.476 90.026 258.987 55,5% 30,3%
Commercial­
vehicles
192.195 133.237 6.463 80.895 42,1% 4,9%
Total 658.895 430.713 96.489 339.882 51,6% 22,4%
Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm
By the turn of the century Turkish industries were hit by two crises: the Marmara earthquake in 
1999­and­the­financial­crisis­in­2001.­Marmara­region,­where­the­major­part­of­the­Turkish­auto-
motive industry is located, is the main industrial and trading region in Turkey accounting nearly for 
39% of Turkey’s gross domestic product3 (GDP). The earthquake in 1999 had terrifying impacts 
1­­Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm­
2­­Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm
3  Istanbul only generates ca. 25% of Turkey’s GDP.
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on the industries of the cities of Kocaeli and Adapazari where a number of automotive MNEs 
and a large number of automotive suppliers are located. While the region was just recovering 
from­the­severe­impacts­of­the­earthquake,­a­financial­crisis­hit­the­country­in­February­2001.­This­
crisis resulted from the unsustainability of growing structural issues in the Turkish banking system 
and ended with the bankruptcies of about 20 banks in Turkey together with a very high level of 
devaluation of the Turkish currency4.
According to interviews with automotive MNE managers made by McKinsey consultants, the 
main­automotive­industry­CSAs­in­Turkey­as­of­2000­were­cheap­labor­costs,­highly­skilled­labor,­
cheap raw material costs, a developing automotive parts supplier market, and the proximity to 
European markets (McKinsey Global Institute 2003, 400).
4.1 Assessment of Changes in the Diamond of Turkey from 2000 to 2010
There­were­three­major­developments­in­the­first­decade­of­the­century­to­affect­Turkey’s­dia-
mond.­The­first­one­was­the­enlargement­of­ the­EU­to­ include­Eastern­European­countries­ in­
2004­and­2007.­Major­automotive­manufacturing­Eastern­European­countries­such­as­the­Czech­
Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary joined the EU in 2004, and Romania joined 
in 2007. These are competitor locations to Turkey for supplying Western European markets. 
A second development was the start of EU accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005, and 
the third  development was the achievement of economic and political stability in Turkey during 
the  decade. Following the 2001 crisis, major structural reforms were undertaken in the  banking 
industry, and the single ruling Justice and Development party pursued consistent economic 
and­budgetary­policies­which­helped­to­achieve­single-digit­levels­of­inflation.­Next­we­evaluate­
changes in the four elements of the diamond. 
Factor Conditions:­With­ a­ 50-year-history­ in­ 2000,­ the­ automotive­ industry­ in­ Turkey­ already­
­possessed­basic­factor­conditions­including­infrastructure,­skilled­labor­at­low­cost,­and­know-
ledge on assembly processes. A major limitation in factor conditions at this time was the lack of 
economic­and­political­stability.­During­the­1990s­Turkey­was­a­hyperinflationary­economy­with­
major economic crises, and the ruling political coalitions having failed to achieve political  stability. 
As­a­result,­access­to­capital­in­the­country­was­limited­and­high-cost,­posing­a­major­drawback­
in the development of local industries. Despite the existence of high quality  universities, there 
were­no­industry-specific­research­institutes­with­university­level­programs­in­the­field­of­auto-
motive engineering only just emerging. Moreover there were only few R&D projects in the auto-
motive­industry­supported­by­the­Scientific­and­Technological­Research­Council­of­Turkey5. 
Turkey­progressed­in­the­creation­of­advanced­factor­conditions­during­the­decade.­The­cumu-
lative­ number­ of­ automotive­ R&D­ projects­ supported­ by­ the­ Scientific­ and­ Technological­
4­­­114%­increase­in­the­value­of­US­Dollar­from­Jan­1,­2001­to­Dec.­31,­2001.­Source:­Central­Bank­of­the­Republic­of­
Turkey,­http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/cbt-uk.html
5­­Source:­Scientific­and­Technological­Research­Council­of­Turkey,­http://www.tubitak.gov.tr/en­
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­Research­ Council­ of­ Turkey­ had­ reached­ 592­ by­ 20106. Many universities have established 
bachelor and master level programs in automotive engineering, and the Automotive Technolo-
gies­Research­&­Development­Company­ (OTAM)7, was established in 2003 by a consortium 
including­Istanbul­Technical­University,­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­and­the­Scientific­
and­Technological­Research­Council­of­Turkey.­This­was­followed­by­the­establishment­of­ the­
Automotive Technology Platform (OTEP)8, in 2008. This platform brings together innovative R&D 
efforts­by­universities,­firms­ in­ the­automotive­and­automotive­supply­ industries,­and­ industry­
associations. 
It is evident that Turkey cannot remain competitive in terms of basic factor conditions like cheap 
labor­ costs­ and­ cheap­material­ costs­ in­ the­ long-run.­Automotive­manufacturing­ countries­ in­
Eastern Europe offer similar advantages with closer proximity to Western European markets. 
Advanced factors need to be created in terms of advanced engineering skills and innovative 
 capabilities. We can conclude that the Turkish automotive industry has taken steps in this 
 direction, progressing from basic factors towards advanced ones. 
Demand Conditions: Turkey has a population of ca. 74 million with a low but growing and un-
equally distributed disposable household income9. Total automotive sales in Turkey have been 
increasing from 658.895 units in 2000 (see Table 2) to 793.172 units in 2010 (see Table 3), an 
average growth of 2,0% per annum10. 
Table 3: Key statistics of Turkish automotive industry in year 2000.
Domestic 
sales
(units)
Production 
(units)
Exports
(units)
Imports
(units)
Imports/ 
domestic 
sales
(%)
Exports/ 
production 
(%)
Passenger 
cars
466.700 297.476 90.026 258.987 55,5% 30,3%
Commercial­
vehicles
192.195 133.237 6.463 80.895 42,1% 4,9%
Total 658.895 430.713 96.489 339.882 51,6% 22,4%
Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm
The demand composition in the country is mostly in lower and medium areas of the spectrum 
as it can be expected from the low level of disposable household income. Interestingly, however, 
there is increasing demand towards import vehicles. The percentage of import vehicles has in-
creased from 51.6% in 2000 to 58.7% in 2010. Such increase is more evident in the case of 
passenger cars from 55.5% to 69.5%. Indeed, percentage of imports in commercial vehicles has 
­ 6­Source:­Scientific­and­Technological­Research­Council­of­Turkey,­http://www.tubitak.gov.tr/en
 7 See http://www.otam.com.tr/ 
 8 See http://www.otep.org.tr/ 
­ 9­Average­annual­disposable­household­income­was­22.063­Turkish­Lira­(ca.­10.000­Euro)­in­2010.­Source:­Turkish­
Statistics Institute, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
10 ca. 4.5% per annum for commercial vehicles and ca. 0.9% per annum for passenger cars.
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decreased thanks to Turkey’s becoming Europe’s number one location in the production of light 
commercial vehicles as of 2010.
When we consider the conditions of demand in Turkey, we should also think about demand 
 conditions in the EU as a result of the customs union. During the decade Turkey has grown 
to­become­a­production­location­for­the­EU.­This­fact­ is­evident­from­the­export­figures­which­
 increased from 96.489 units in 2000 to 754.469 units in 2010. Key destination export markets in 
2010 were Western Europe (69%), Eastern Europe (9%), Africa (8%), Middle East (4%),  Americas 
(4%), and others (6%)11. The distribution of export shares by destination markets in 2010 are 
 similar to those in 2000 where the EU (including Western Europe and Eastern Europe) accounts 
for nearly 78% of Turkey’s total automotive exports. 
Demand conditions for Turkey are relatively good given its large and growing home market and 
growing markets in neighboring Eastern Europe. We could also argue that the current economic 
crisis in the saturated markets in Western Europe may be an advantage for Turkey if European 
consumers shift their preferences towards less expensive vehicles.
Related and Supporting Industries: Due to its more than 10.000 parts, the automotive  industry 
has connections to a variety of industries including automotive supply industry, automotive 
 retail  industry, electronics industry, chemical industry, metal industry, glass industry, and plastic 
 industry. Among these the most important one is the automotive supply industry. The automotive 
supply industry in 2000 accounted for 47% of total generated revenues, 83% of total employment, 
and 56% of total exports in the Turkish automotive industry (McKinsey Global Institute 2003). 
 Almost 85% of the Turkish automotive supply industry was made up of Turkish family businesses, 
and there were also about 150 foreign suppliers which set up facilities in joint venture agreements 
with Turkish suppliers12.­This­industry­has­significantly­grown­in­Turkey­during­the­decade­as­the­
total automotive capacity has increased from 700.000 vehicles in 2000 to 1.555.615 vehicles 
in 201013. Under the motto of “strong industry, strong brands” cooperation between automotive 
MNEs and their suppliers has changed from a transactional approach to partnership approach, 
motivating suppliers to take more important roles in joint design and R&D projects14. According 
to­ reports­ of­ Turkish­Association­ of­ Automotive­Parts­ &­Components­Manufacturers,­ Turkish­
 suppliers have entered global supply chains of automotive MNEs and exported ca. 6.7 billion 
USD of output in 2010.
Our evaluation is that the supply industry in Turkey has grown to become an internationally 
 competitive industry with increasing R&D capabilities, and this provides strong support for the 
Turkish automotive industry. 
11­ ­Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm
12­­Source:­Turkish­Association­of­Automotive­Parts­&­Components­Manufacturers,­http://www.taysad.org.tr/www/en/­
13­­Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm
14­­Source:­Turkish­Association­of­Automotive­Parts­&­Components­Manufacturers,­http://www.taysad.org.tr/www/en/­
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Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry: In assessing this variable we focus on the degree of rivalry 
since automotive MNEs are of various origins and thus have different strategies and structures. 
Competition­in­the­Turkish­automotive­industry­has­intensified­as­the­production­capacity­in­Tur-
key has increased from 700.000 units in 2000 to 1.555.615 units in 2010, and more competitors 
have taken bites in market shares from the Turkish market. As of 2000, the vehicle park of Turkey 
was dominated by the brands of three MNEs. Fiat, Renault, and Ford occupied 31%, 26%, and 
11% of the market respectively15. This dominance had eroded by 2010 (see Table 4).
Table 4: Automotive sales and market shares in Turkey in year 2010.
Brands Sales in year 2010 (units)
Market Share in year 2010
(%)
Ford 119 133 15,0%
Fiat 109 938 13,9%
Renault 94 943 12,0%
VW 63 840 8,0%
Hyundai 49 888 6,3%
Peugeot 43 395 5,5%
Opel 41 572 5,2%
Toyota 40 058 5,1%
Citroen 28 862 3,6%
Dacia 19 168 2,4%
Chevrolet 18 061 2,3%
Mercedes Benz 17 562 2,2%
Honda 16 259 2,0%
Nissan 13 264 1,7%
BMW 12 034 1,5%
Audi 9 656 1,2%
Kia 9 652 1,2%
Mitsubishi 6 499 0,8%
Skoda 6 332 0,8%
Seat 5 113 0,6%
Others 67 943 8,6%
TOTAL 793 172 100,0%
Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm.
In summary the diamond of the Turkish automotive industry improved during the ten years thanks 
to the creation of innovative R&D capabilities, evolution of a more investment friendly, economi-
cally and politically stable business environment in Turkey, growing national demand together 
with ease of access to the EU market, development of highly capable partners in the automotive 
supply industry, and intensifying levels of competition. Next, we would like to see how automotive 
MNEs responded to these changes.
15­­Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm­
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4.2 Assessment of Changes in MNEs’ Market Entry Strategies from 2000 to 2010
Table 5 presents the strategies of the MNEs which make up the manufacturing capacity in Turkey 
in­2010.­To­understand­changes­in­their­strategies­we­compare­their­production­figures­in­2000­
and­2010­and­also­analyze­their­sales­and­exports­figures­ in­2010­in­the­ light­of­ their­generic­
strategies and market entry motives.
Table 5:­MNE­strategies­and­figures.
MNE Generic Strategy
Market Entry 
Motive
Production 
Capacity 
in Year 
2010
(units)
Production 
in Turkey 
in Year 
2000  
(units)
Production 
in Turkey 
in Year 
2010  
(units)
Exports 
from 
 Turkey in 
Year 2010 
(units)
Sales in 
Turkey 
in Year 
2010
(units)
Fiat Cost­
 leadership
Efficiency­ 
seeking
400 000 124 150 312 245 193 737 109 938
Renault Cost­
 leadership
Efficiency­ 
seeking
360 000 138 478 307 083 233 057 94 943
Ford Cost­
 leadership
Efficiency­ 
seeking
330 000 41 065 242 070 175 749 119 133
Toyota Cost­
 leadership
Efficiency­ 
seeking, market 
seeking
150 000 14 715 83 286 73 163 40 058
Hyundai Cost­
 leadership
Efficiency­ 
seeking, market 
seeking
125 000 0 77 000 42 396 49 888
Honda Cost­
 leadership
Efficiency­ 
seeking, market 
seeking
50 000 9 821 20 305 10 632 16 259
Others   100 655 102 484 52 568 25 735 362 953
TOTAL   1 515 655 430 713 1 094 557 754 469 793 172
Source:­Turkish­Automotive­Manufacturers­Association,­http://www.osd.org.tr/index-english.htm.
The­first­thing­that­attracts­our­attention­is­that­all­MNEs­manufacturing­in­Turkey­pursue­cost­
leadership­strategy.­This­is­understandable­given­Turkey’s­CSAs­in­cheap­labor­and­raw­material­
costs. However, this may be an alarming signal for Turkey since lower costs as sources of com-
petitive­advantages­may­not­be­sustainable­in­the­long-run­in­the­face­of­competition­from­other­
emerging countries in Eastern Europe.
A second observation is that the increase in Turkey’s automotive production is coming mainly 
from capacity increases of MNEs which already had manufacturing facilities in Turkey in 2000. 
There are only two new entrants. One is Hyundai, the Korean manufacturer which is  targeting 
the lower end of the market in passenger cars. The other one is Ford which decided to  terminate 
its  production of passenger cars in Istanbul in the early 2000s and made a large investment in 
 Golcuk, a municipality of the city of Kocaeli, for the manufacturing of light commercial  vehicles. 
With this investment Ford made Turkey its European hub for light commercial vehicles. As Fiat 
also followed Ford in this trend, Turkey became Europe’s largest manufacturer of light  commercial 
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 vehicles as of 2010. The observation that there were not many new entrants during the  decade 
may­ be­ due­ to­ two­ reasons.­ First,­ it­ indicates­ the­ importance­ of­ earlier-made­ market­ ­entry­
 decisions and the accompanying role of path dependency. Secondly, most of the automotive 
MNEs had made their entries in the 1990s around the time of the establishment of the customs 
union with the EU. 
A­third­observation­is­that­the­majority­of­the­MNEs­manufacturing­in­Turkey­are­non-Europeans.­
Main­motives­for­entering­Turkey­have­been­a­mixture­of­efficiency­seeking­and­market­seeking.­
Thanks to the customs union, Turkey was a point of entry choice for Asian MNEs like Toyota, 
Honda, and Hyundai into the EU. The two Europeans, Renault and Fiat had both entered the 
Turkish­market­way­back­in­1971.­Choosing­Turkey­was­a­natural­decision­in­their­market­entry­
strategies­of­ investing­ in­growing­emerging­markets­which­suited­ their­efficiency­seeking­and­
market seeking motives simultaneously. The reason why we do not see any production FDI in 
Turkey from European manufacturers that employ a differentiation strategy (e.g., BMW, Daimler) 
may be attributed to the customs union. We conclude that a purely market seeking motive inside 
a customs union would not necessitate production FDI in an industry where economies of scale 
are important, and the need for adaptation is minimum.
A fourth observation is that during the period, not only production FDI in Turkey but also  imports 
of vehicles into Turkey and exports of vehicles from Turkey have increased. Increase in exports 
is understandable as Turkey has become a production location not only to serve the  domestic 
market but also the EU. To explain the increase in imports we need to understand that automo-
tive MNEs do not make production FDI in a country to manufacture their whole product range. 
Instead, they manufacture certain types of products in certain countries. This fact makes it 
 evident why FDI and exporting are not rival strategies but complementary ones in the automo-
tive  industry. This fact also suggests that to understand location strategies of MNEs we should 
look at their strategies at regional level rather than country level. Therefore, we will next analyze 
changes from 2000 to 2010 in European production location strategies of Fiat, Renault, Ford, 
Toyota,­Hyundai­and­Honda­-­the­automotive­MNEs­that­also­manufacture­in­Turkey.
Fiat’s European production is down by 25% during the decade (see Table 6). This is no wonder as 
Fiat has been a troubled MNE losing market shares. With the intentions to lower its cost structure, 
Fiat­has­also­moved­its­production­from­high­labor-cost­Italy­to­Poland­and­Turkey.­Italy,­Poland­
and Turkey are Fiat’s three main production locations in 2010 accounting for 47%, 28%, and 20% 
of total European production.
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Table 6: Fiat’s location strategies in Europe from year 2000 to year 2010
Production 
Location Types of Products
Production 
in 
Year 2000 
(units)
Production 
 in 
Year 2010 
(units)
Change in 
Production 
from Year 2000 
to Year 2010  
in the Location 
(%)
Share in 
Total 
European 
Production 
in Year 2010 
(%)
Germany Fire­fighting­vehicles,­
heavy trucks
13 495 7 762 -42% 0%
France Buses,­fire­fighting­
 vehicles, engines, 
passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles
52 070 24 322 -53% 2%
Hungary Passenger cars 0 16 851 1%
Italy Passenger cars,  
heavy­trucks,­fire­ 
fighting­vehicles,­light­
commercial vehicles, 
special vehicles
1 583 004 740 133 -53% 47%
Poland Passenger cars, 
engines
281 475 440 324 56% 28%
Serbia Passenger cars, buses 0 17 663 1%
Spain Fire­fighting­vehicles 47 240 24 932 -47% 2%
Turkey Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles
124 150 312 245 152% 20%
Europe Total  2 101 434 1 584 232 -25% 100%
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, http://www.oica.net/.
Similar changes are observed for Renault (see Table 7). The French MNE’s total European 
­production­is­down­by­11%,­and­production­has­shifted­significantly­from­high­labor-cost­­countries­
such as France and Spain to Romania, Turkey, Slovenia and Russia. Different from Fiat,  Renault’s 
share of production in the home country is lower (32% of total European production), and the rest 
is shared evenly among four countries, namely Spain (20%), Romania (17%), Turkey (15%), and 
Slovenia (10%). 
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Table 7: Renault’s location strategies in Europe from year 2000 to year 2010.
Production 
Location Types of Products
Production 
in
Year 2000 
(units)
Production
 in 
Year 2010 
(units)
Change in 
Production 
from Year 2000 
to Year 2010  
in the Location 
(%)
Share in 
Total 
European 
Production 
in Year 2010 
(%)
France Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles, 
engines
1 452 117 636 818 -56% 32%
Romania Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles, 
engines
0 341 090 17%
Russia Passenger cars 0 87 228 4%
Slovenia Passenger cars 122 949 211 340 72% 10%
Spain Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles
545 019 398 524 -27% 20%
Turkey Passenger cars, 
engines
138 478 307 083 122% 15%
United 
 Kingdom
Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles
0 34 428 2%
Europe Total  2 258 563 2 016 511 -11% 100%
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, http://www.oica.net/.
Ford has also lost 32% of its European production from 2000 to 2010 mainly due to the termina-
tion of United Kingdom, Sweden and Holland as manufacturing locations following the sales of 
Jaguar,­Land­Rover,­and­Volvo­during­the­decade­(see­Table­8).­Ford’s­main­production­base­in­
Europe is Germany (47% of total European production) followed by Spain (17%), Turkey (16%), 
and Belgium (12%). Turkey emerged as Ford’s European base for light commercial vehicles in 
this decade.
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Table 8: Ford’s location strategies in Europe from year 2000 to year 2010. 
Production 
Location Types of Products
Production 
in 
Year 2000 
(units)
Production 
in
 Year 2010 
(units)
Change in 
Production 
from Year 2000 
to Year 2010 
in the Location 
(%)
Share in 
Total 
European 
Production 
in Year 2010 
(%)
Belgium Passenger cars 417 738 185 692 -56% 12%
Germany Passenger cars, 
engines
577 386 741 803 28% 48%
Holland Passenger cars 158 218 0 -100% 0%
Poland Passenger cars 20 000 82 323 312% 5%
Portugal Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles
52 053 0 -100% 0%
Romania Light­commercial­ve-
hicles, engines
0 9 558 1%
Spain Passenger cars, 
engines
343 794 256 650 -25% 17%
Sweden Passenger cars 150 980 0 -100% 0%
Turkey Light­commercial­
vehicles, midibuses, 
engines
41 065 242 070 489% 16%
United 
 Kingdom
Passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles, 
engines
528 871 28 270 -95% 2%
Europe Total  2 290 105 1 546 366 -32% 100%
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, http://www.oica.net/.
Toyota’s production in Europe increased in the 2000s by 140% to 461.647 units (see Table 9). 
Turkey is one of Toyota’s four major production locations in Europe accounting for 18% of its 
 European production. Other major locations are France (34%), the United Kingdom (30%), and 
the­Czech­Republic­(18%).
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Table 9: Toyota’s location strategies in Europe from year 2000 to year 2010. 
Production 
Location Types of Products
Production 
in 
Year 2000 
(units)
Production 
in 
Year 2010 
(units)
Change in 
Production 
from Year 2000 
to Year 2010 
in the Location 
(%)
Share in 
Total 
European 
Production 
in Year 2010 
(%)
Czech­
 Republic
Passenger cars 0 82 920 18%
France Passenger cars, 
engines
0 158 504 34%
Italy Passenger cars 2 000 0 -100% 0%
Portugal Light­commercial­
vehicles
4 519 0 -100% 0%
Turkey Passenger cars 14 715 83 286 466% 18%
United 
 Kingdom
Passenger cars, 
engines
171 339 136 937 -20% 30%
Europe Total  192 573 461 647 140% 100%
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, http://www.oica.net/.
Hyundai did not have any production FDI in Europe by 2000 (see Table 10). During the following 
decade the Korean MNE changed its market entry strategy in Europe from pure exporting to a 
combination of export and production FDI. Its main choices of location are Slovakia (45% of total 
European­production),­the­Czech­Republic­(39%),­and­Turkey­(15%).
Table 10: Hyundai’s location strategies in Europe from year 2000 to year 2010.
Production 
Location Types of Products
Production 
in 
Year 2000 
(units)
Production 
in 
Year 2010 
(units)
Change in 
Production 
from Year 2000 
to Year 2010 
in the Location 
(%)
Share in 
Total 
European 
Production 
in Year 2010 
(%)
Czech­
 Republic
Passenger cars 0 200 088 39%
Russia Passenger cars 0 217 0%
Slovakia Passenger cars, 
engines
0 229 505 45%
Turkey Passenger cars 0 77 000 15%
Europe Total  0 506 810 100%
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, http://www.oica.net/.
Despite­the­increase­by­89%­from­2000,­Honda’s­production­level­in­Europe­in­2010­is­signifi-
cantly lower at 159.569 units (see Table 11). The United Kingdom is the Japanese MNE’s main 
production base in Europe accounting for 87% of total European production. Turkey is the other 
location with a 13% share.
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Table 11: Honda’s location strategies in Europe from year 2000 to year 2010.
Production 
Location Types of Products
Production 
in 
Year 2000 
(units)
Production 
in 
Year 2010 
(units)
Change in 
Production 
from Year 2000 
to Year 2010 
in the Location 
(%)
Share in 
Total 
European 
Production 
in Year 2010 
(%)
Turkey Passenger cars 9 821 20 305 107% 13%
United 
 Kingdom
Passenger cars 74 751 139 264 86% 87%
Europe Total  84 572 159 569 89% 100%
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, http://www.oica.net/
One can wonder why Toyota and Honda have high proportions of their European production in 
high­ labor-cost­ countries­ like­ the­United­Kingdom­and­France.­ The­ Japanese­MNEs­entered­
the UK in the 1980s when the shattered British automotive industry, once the second largest 
in the world after the US in the 1950s, was desperate for foreign investors for survival, and the 
 British government offered good incentives to the Japanese. In the case of France, Toyota chose 
 deliberately a location where level of unemployment was highest, thus avoiding high labor costs. 
In the light of these observations about MNEs we will assess our three propositions next. 
We accept proposition 1 in that changes in Turkey’s diamond have attracted more production in 
the country, and Turkey has developed to become an automotive base for supplying major EU 
markets in Western Europe. 
We also accept proposition 2 because MNEs that have made production FDI in Turkey all share 
the generic strategy of cost leadership. MNEs pursuing a differentiation strategy, such as BMW, 
Daimler, and Porsche have not invested in Turkey. This is understandable as Turkey lags behind 
Western European locations in innovative capabilities that MNEs which aim to differentiate them-
selves would be seeking, and a pure market seeking motive would not necessitate production FDI. 
Finally, we also accept Proposition 3. The main motive to establish production FDI in Turkey for all 
six­MNEs­has­been­efficiency­seeking.­For­Asian­manufacturers­market­seeking­has­also­been­
an­influential­motive­to­access­the­EU­Single­Market.­All­other­MNEs­which­have­targeted­only­
the Turkish market have pursued an export market entry strategy. Based on these  observations 
we propose the following correlations between generic strategies, market entry motives, and 
choices of market entry strategies: 
Proposition 4a:  MNEs which pursue cost leadership strategy would have an efficiency seeking 
motive, and that would lead to the decision to make production FDI in the host 
country. 
Proposition 4a:  MNEs which pursue a differentiation strategy would have a market seeking mo-
tive, and that would lead to the decision to export to the host country.
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5. Discussion
This­paper­aimed­to­shed­light­on­responses­of­MNEs­to­evolving­CSAs­offered­by­host­countries­
in the context of changing market entry strategies in the Turkish automotive industry from 2000 
to­2010.­Turkey’s­national­diamond­in­the­automotive­industry­improved­significantly­during­the­
 decade. The customs union agreement with the EU in 1996, the launching of full membership 
negotiations in 2005, structural reforms in the banking system after the 2001 crisis,  achievement 
of economic stability thanks to consistent monetary and budgetary policies, and political  stability 
under the single party governance all contributed to this improvement. The Turkish automotive 
industry offers MNEs a highly skilled but relatively cheap labor force with improving  innovative 
capabilities, access to a growing large domestic market and to the world’s largest single  market, 
namely the EU, and an increasingly more capable supply industry. These offerings have been 
 exploited mainly by MNEs like Fiat, Renault, and Ford which are pursuing a cost leadership 
­strategy­and­have­an­efficiency­seeking­motive.­Turkey­has­also­been­one­of­the­primary­­choices­
in Europe as production location for Asian MNEs like Toyota, Hyundai, and Honda in their 
 strategies to enter European markets. 
Our­findings­lead­us­to­some­suggestions­for­international­research­on­foreign­direct­investments­
and­the­match­between­CSAs­and­FSAs.­First­of­all,­we­argue­that­CSAs­of­a­host­country­are­
not equally attractive for all potential foreign MNE entrants. The attractiveness may be linked 
to FSAs (see Rugman et al. 2012), but we suggest that the competitive strategy of the MNE 
is­ a­more­ ­suitable­ variable­ to­ study­ rather­ than­FSAs.­The­ suitability­ lies­ in­ easier­ definition,­
identification,­and­operationalization­of­strategy­compared­to­FSAs.­This­would­not­be­a­wrong­
choice­since,­by­following­RBV,­we­can­indirectly­assume­that­the­competitive­strategy­of­the­firm­
reflects­that­FSAs­are­on­opposite­sides­of­the­same­coin­(Wernerfelt­1984).­In­the­light­of­this­
suggestion, our main contribution in this paper is that we were able to derive in  propositions 4a 
and 4b clear  relationships between MNE generic strategies, market entry motives, and choices 
of market  entry strategy. Our second suggestion is that when studying market entry strategy or 
more­­specifically­FDI,­we­should­not­purely­look­at­the­interplay­between­FSAs­of­the­entrant­and­
CSAs­of­the­host­country­as­it­has­been­done­by­the­transaction­cost­theory­for­instance­(see­
Hennart 2009). Instead we should analyze MNE’s regional location strategies, and only then we 
understand that export and FDI are indeed complementary strategies in the  automotive  industry. 
The MNEs which we studied had three to four major production locations in Europe where 
they­manufactured­­different­types­of­vehicles.­Such­a­network­type­of­configuration­­stimulates­
also trade across borders. In this paper we also make a contribution to the diamond model of 
­Michael­Porter­(1990).­This­model­was­criticized­heavily­for­being­a­static­model­which­is­difficult­
to  operationalize and which explains competitive advantages of large industrialized countries 
(Rugman/D’Cruz­1993).­We­provide­here­an­example­of­how­this­model­can­be­operationalized­
and used in a dynamic perspective in the context of an emerging country. One criticism of the 
model could be that by considering government as a variable that may affect determinants of 
the diamond (similar to chance events), it takes for granted the importance of macroeconomic 
­stability­ and­ political­ ­leadership­ in­ the­ country.­ These­ two­ factors­ can­ be­ highly­ influential­ in­
the case of emerging economies as we have seen in the case of Turkey. Finally, we review the 
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­double­diamond­model­of­Rugman­and­D’Cruz­(1993).­This­model­suggests­that­determinants­in­
the country’s main trading partners or home region should be taken into account when  assessing 
competitive advantages of especially small countries. This may work relatively easily in the case 
of­Canada­where­there­are­only­two­countries­to­be­considered­in­the­North­American­Free­Trade­
Agreement,­namely­the­USA­and­Mexico.­The­model­becomes­difficult­to­operationalize­when,­
like in the case of Turkey, we would be assessing the diamond of the EU with its 27 member 
countries. 
Based­on­our­findings­we­also­make­some­suggestions­for­MNE­managers.­As­exhibited­in­this­
paper,­Michael­Porter’s­diamond­model­is­an­operational­tool­to­assess­CSAs­of­a­host­country­
in­a­dynamic­manner.­MNE­managers­should­evaluate­host­country­CSAs­and­their­match­with­
their competitive strategies before making their market entry mode decisions. The current trend 
in the European automotive industry is to shift production from the West to the East. This trend 
was­­triggered­by­the­global­financial­crisis­of­2008­as­it­put­more­competitive­pressure­on­MNEs­
to lower their costs. MNE managers should remember that this is not the cure for everything. 
MNEs that follow a differentiation strategy and rely on innovative capabilities to achieve such 
differentiation­can­charge­premium­prices­from­customers­and­thus­compete­profitably­despite­
manufacturing­ in­ high­ labor-cost­ countries.­ One­ last­ suggestion­ for­managers­ of­ automotive­
MNEs­is­that­this­is­a­regional­industry.­They­should­develop­a­regional­strategy­in­configuring­
their value chains, and in doing that they should consider a portfolio of three or four countries in 
Europe for their production locations. Managers should also remember that location decisions 
can be path dependent. In other words, once a decision is made and implemented, it may not be 
easy­to­withdraw.­Thus,­a­carefully­designed,­long-term­oriented­portfolio­will­ensure­long-term­
competitiveness. 
Last­but­not­ least­we­have­suggestions­ for­policy­makers­ in­host­countries­as­well.­Attracting­
inward FDI is important especially in emerging economies for creating jobs, and bringing to the 
country technology and capital. We sometimes see governments competing with each other in 
what­we­may­call­zero-sum­competition­by­offering­excessive­investment­incentives.­Such­was­
the­case­between­the­Czech­Republic­and­Turkey­when­Hyundai­was­to­decide­for­its­­production­
location in Europe. Instead of entering into such competition, policy makers of host countries 
should think strategically in selecting which MNEs to attract to the country. Turkey stands on 
­vulnerable­ground­as­all­the­MNEs­have­selected­the­country­mainly­for­efficiency­seeking­­motives­
aiming­to­exploit­the­country’s­low-cost­factor­conditions.­As­low­cost­is­not­a­source­of­sustain-
able competitive advantage in the long run, policy makers should target  creation of  advanced 
factor conditions that will also attract MNEs which pursue differentiation strategy.  Policies to 
foster­investments­in­industry­specific­training­and­R&D­would­be­strategically­­correct.­A­second­
vulnerability of Turkey lies in the fact that two of the three main manufacturers in the country, 
namely­Fiat­and­Ford,­have­been­in­significant­financial­trouble­recently.­Based­on­past­examples­
one may argue that brands in this industry continue to live in the hands of other manufacturers 
even though MNEs fail to survive. However, a possible bankruptcy of these MNEs would naturally 
have­significantly­negative­consequences.­Turkish­policy­makers­could­consider­having­in­their­
investor portfolio also successful MNEs, such as German MNEs. During a recent visit of Angela 
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Merkel in Turkey, the Turkish minister of industry considered it a big loss that the Volkswagen 
Group, the market leader in Europe, is still not present in Turkey as a manufacturer. Attracting 
successful­MNEs­like­the­Volkswagen­Group­would­add­to­the­healthy­long-term­­success­of­the­
Turkish automotive industry. 
This research was not without its limitations. First of all, it could be of further value to  conduct 
 interviews with industry experts as well as managers of automotive MNEs to gain richer  insights. 
Due to resource limitations, lack of primary data collection was partly compensated by the 
 industry and country knowledge of the author who had working knowledge of the  Turkish auto-
motive  industry and wrote his doctoral thesis about the European automotive industry. Secondly, 
we  focused on market entry modes of exporting and production FDI. This deliberate limitation 
was­reasonable­since­production­FDI­resembles­the­choice­to­exploit­host-country­CSAs,­and­
 exporting  resembles the choice not to do so. In future research differences in other types of  market 
entry­ choices­ (e.g.,­ greenfield­ vs.­ acquisition)­ could­also­be­analyzed.­Thirdly,­we­ ­limited­our­
 research to those MNEs that had invested in Turkey. In order to gain a full picture of the  industry, 
production location strategies of all other automotive MNEs in Europe could be  scrutinized. As 
that, however, would change the nature of the paper we will leave it to future research. We also 
recommend carrying out further studies on other industries, countries and regions using a similar 
theoretical approach for future research. Such an endeavor would enable testing of our induced 
propositions. 
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